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Abstract
This article asks why unemployment performance in small coun-
tries in European Monetary Union has been superior to that in
large EMU countries. Within a model of monopolistic competi-
tion, it is shown that a possible answer is a beggar-thy-neighbor
policy by the small countries. When dropping the real balance
eﬀect from a standard model of monopolistic competition, it is
found that a monopoly trade union setting wages for a large econ-
omy cannot inﬂuence employment and output by changing nomi-
nal wages. A trade union in a small country which is in a mone-
tary union with a large country, on the other hand, can increase
output and employment by wage restraint.
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1. Introduction
Unemployment in European Monetary Union (EMU) is still ram-
pant. While it is not yet back at the peak level of the early
1990s, the 2001/2002 recession nevertheless left heavy marks
in the labour markets. The hope of early 1999/2000 that this
time the expansion would help European governments to reduce
unemployment substantially lies shattered in pieces. However,
what is even more astonishing about the European unemploy-
ment performance are the diﬀerences between the single coun-
tries: It is predominantly the big EMU countries which show
a dismal labour market performance while some of the smaller
countries until very recently managed to tackle their unemploy-
ment problems reasonably well.
This article tries to give an explanation for this feature of
European unemployment. It will argue that strategically acting
unions in small countries within EMU have the possibility to
chose between high real wages and low employment on the one
hand and lower real wages and high employment on the other
hand. Unions in large countries in contrast do not have this pos-
sibility. In their case nominal wage restraint does not lead to
lower real wages but only to lower prices. The rationale behind
this notion is rather simple: In a small country within EMU
changes in nominal wages improve the competitiveness vis-` a-vis
the rest of EMU and thus inﬂuence strongly export demand.
Wage changes in large countries on the other hand inﬂuence do-
mestic EMU demand in the same direction as the nominal wage
change and in such an extent that aggregate demand remains
largely unchanged.
The article is organised as follows: Section 2 outlines some
features of European unemployment and reviews the standard
explanation of the reasons and cure for European unemployment.
Section 3 explains why this standard approach is questionable
for theoretical reasons, mainly the assumption of a real balance
eﬀect. An alternative model without real balances will then be
presented. Section 4 concludes.128 European Political Economy Review
2. European Unemployment and the Standard Expla-
nation
Table 1 shows some of the main features of the development of
EMU unemployment in the late 1990s: While Ireland, Spain and
Finland1 had emerged from the EMS crisis in 1992 with a very
high level of unemployment, they managed to bring that level
down strongly towards the beginning of the new century.2 On
the other hand, none of the three large EMU countries Italy,
France and Germany, managed to make a signiﬁcant reduction
in its unemployment rate. Moreover, at the end of 2001, it was
only the three large EMU countries and spain which still had
unemployment rates above 7 percent.3
When regressing standardized unemployment rates from the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
for EMU countries in 2001 on the size of the single EMU coun-
try (as a share of EMU Gross Domestic Product) and the level
of unemployment it experienced in 1993, we get the following
equation (with t-statistics in parantheses):4
U2001 = 0:91038
(0:727)
+0:13987share
(2:495)
+0:42507U
1993
(4:242)
R2= 0:75745
Except the constant, the right-hand variables are signiﬁcant
at the 5-percent-level. We thus see that the size of a country
within EMU has a strong positive eﬀect on the unemployment
level. Just as can be expected, the initial unemployment rate in
1993 also has a strong inﬂuence on unemployment in 2001 which
points to a hysteresis problem in EMU. GDP share and initial
1 Though Finland has not been member of European Union at that time,
it had pegged its markka to the Ecu. Consequently, it had also been hit by
the turbulences after the EMS crisis.
2 Throughout the whole article, the period from 1993 to 2001 will be ex-
amined. Even though EMU only started in 1999, the period from 1993 can
be seen as a period of de facto ﬁxed exchange rates in Europe as no large
alignments took place after 1993.
3 All unemployment rates in this article are standarised unemployment
rates from (OECD 2002).
4 Note that the sample size is very small and the coeﬃcients therefore
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Share of Reduction in Unemployment
Country EMU-GDP Unemployment Level in 1993
in 1997 1993-2001
Germany 33.41 0 7.9
France 22.15 -2.7 11.3
Italy 18.23 -0.6 10.1
Spain 8.45 -7.5 22.5
Netherlands 5.74 -3.8 6.2
Belgium 3.85 -2.0 8.6
Austria 3.28 -0.4 4.0
Portugal 1.54 -1.5 5.6
Ireland 1.20 -11.8 15.6
Finland 1.89 -7.3 16.4
Luxembourg 0.20 -0.2 2.6
Source: OECD (2002)
Table 1: Level and Reduction of Unemployment in the eleven
original EMU members (EMU-11), 1993-2001
unemployment account for roughly 75 percent of the unemploy-
ment level in 2001. This leaves plenty of space for additional
reasons for reductions in unemployment over that period such
increased low wage subsidies, but also hints at a strong role for
the size of a country in explaining unemployment performance.
Standard textbook economics as embodied in the AS-AD-
model5 has a simple explanation for unemployment: If labour
supply is larger than labour demand, the price for labour (the
wage level) must be too high. When nominal wages fall, the
demand for labour increases lowering the excess supply in the
labour market. With more labour employed, output increases.
At ﬁrst, aggregate demand does not change with increasing ag-
gregate supply as aggregate demand is a function not of the wage
sum paid, but of the real money supply. With excess supply in
5 For an exposition see Romer (1996, chapter 5) or Felderer and Homburg
(1994).130 European Political Economy Review
goods markets, prices fall. As the nominal money supply is ex-
ogenously ﬁxed, this falling price level leads to an increase in
the real money supply. This increased real money supply will
lead to falling interest rates which in turn increase investment
demand. This eﬀect is called Keynes eﬀect. With the increased
investment demand, aggregate demand grows as to equal the new
(increased) aggregate supply. Besides the Keynes eﬀect, in some
extentions of AS-AD a second real balance eﬀect, the Pigou ef-
fect, is included. Here, an increased real money supply increases
consumption demand as it is argued that the real money stock
is part of household wealth and consumption demand a function
of household wealth.
This argument has recently been used by a new strand of lit-
erature relating the interaction of wage bargaining structures and
monetary policy to changes in employment. Soskice and Iversen
(2000) and Coricelli, Cukierman, and Dalmazzo (2000) (SICCD
hereafter) argue within a model of monopolistic competition that
strategically acting unions can use the real balance eﬀect to reach
their employment target under a non-accommodating monetary
policy which does not alter the money supply in order to in-
ﬂuence employment: By exercising wage restraint, they can in-
crease aggregate demand and thus aggregate employment.
The interesting thing in both of the contributions is the
emerging non-neutrality of the monetary policy rule: If the cen-
tral bank accommodates wage changes in a way that it changes
the money stock so that some employment target is met, unions
do not have an incentive to exercise wage restraint as the real
wage/unemployment outcome is the same regardless of their be-
haviour. If, on the other hand, the central bank sets its nominal
money supply regardless of the unions’ behaviour, unions can in
fact increase employment and output by wage restraint. As soon
as employment enters into their utility function, they can be ex-
pected to make use of this option by lowering their wages and
thus increasing output and employment. Consequently, SICCD
conclude that a shift to a less accommodating monetary policy6
6 Or more conservative in Coricelli, Cukierman, and Dalmazzo’s (2000)
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leads to a higher output and employment if unions are able to
act strategically.
When looking at the European performances, this explana-
tion seems to ﬁt some of the cases quite nicely: With entering the
hard phase of the European monetary system and later EMU,
monetary policy for all of the countries but Germany became less
accommodating. Moreover, one could even argue that monetary
policy in Germany grew less accommodating since the 1970s:
Not only did the Bundesbank continously lower the rate of in-
ﬂation which it considered “inevitable” until the rate of German
CPI change reached what the Bundesbank considered as price
stability in 1984 (Bundesbank 1995, p. 83). In addition, it be-
came less concerned about ouput considerations: After the oil
price shock in 1973, the Bundesbank disinﬂated only gradually.
The slowing of business activity in 1974 led the Bundesbank at
least partly to accommodate price increases (Bundesbank 1974,
p. 17). In 1990, when a demand shock from German reuniﬁca-
tion hit the German Economy, the Bundesbank reacted less ﬂex-
ible and thus less accommodating (Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin,
and Posen 1999, p. 74).
With this shift in the monetary policy stance, the structure of
wage increases also changed: While unit labour costs were often
a factor pushing up inﬂation in the 1970s and 1980s, wage setting
in EMU after 1993 has been restrained. As ﬁgure 1 shows, the
cumulated increases in unit labour costs since 1993 have been
signiﬁcantly below an increase with the ECB’s upper inﬂation
limit of 2 percent and even well below a steady increase by 1.5
percent – the rate many observers believe the ECB’s inﬂation
target actually to be at. In some countries such as Ireland and
Germany unit labour costs at the end of the decade were even
below their 1993 value.
Startlingly, the wage restraint did not show up in overall un-
employment ﬁgures. True, Ireland and Spain did indeed manage
to reduce unemployment sharply. However, Germany did not
show promising developments in the labour market though it
also exercises wage restraint relative to the central bank’s in-
ﬂation target. The same can be said about France and Italy,
countries in which unit labour cost development also lagged far132 European Political Economy Review
Figure 1: Unit labour cost developments in EMU
behind even an 1.5 percent annual increase.
Moreover, there might be two more cases in which wage re-
straint in small countries has led to a fall in unemployment, but
which are not covered in the table as the wage restraint hap-
pened slightly before 1993: Finland and the Netherlands. The
Finnish markka devalued sharply after 1991. Even though this
eroded real wages, unions did not push for strong nominal wage
increases. Unit labour costs in European Currency Units (ECU)
terms only slowly recovered after. Finish unit labour costs mea-
sured in ECU were were still only roughly three quarter the 1991
value in 1999. The devaluation with wage restraint was followed
by a large reduction in unemployment.
The Netherlands experienced their wage-restraint-led reduc-
tion in unemployment even earlier than that. After the recession
of the early 1980s, collective bargaining partners took up respon-
sible for employment-friendly wage agreements in the Wassenaar
agreement of 1982. A period of wage growth below the Euro-
pean partners’ wage increases followed while the Dutch guilderDullien : Is Small Really Beautiful? 133
remained tightly pegged to the German mark. In the following
years, unemployment fell from a peak of almost 12 percent to
little more than 2 percent in 2001.7
3. A Model Without Real Balances
While thus the SICCD-explanation seems to be quite promising
at ﬁrst, it does not seem to work for large EMU countries. Here,
two questions have to be raised: First, why did strategically act-
ing unions in Ireland or Spain did indeed agree to larger wage
restraint than German wage bargainers? Second, why was the
positive eﬀect of wage restraint on employment negligible in Ger-
many while it was appeared so strongly in the smaller countries?
As I will argue below, these two questions cannot be answered
separately. The only reason why unions exercise wage restraint
is that they expect to make employment gains while giving away
part of their real wage. If for economic reasons wage restraint
does not lead to higher employment, unions with rational expec-
tations will not be prone to make these wage restraints in the
ﬁrst place. If unions were not sure whether wage restraint did
indeed lead to higher employment, they would at ﬁrst restrain
their wages a little and would observe what happens. If it then
turned out that wage restraint was fruitless, there would be little
reason to expect further wage restraint.
3.1. Questioning the Real Balance Eﬀect
One reason why the initial wage restraint as exercised by German
wage bargainers after 1995 might not have produced the labour
market improvements as envisioned by SICCD is the possibility
that the real balance eﬀect does not work in practise as it is
assumed in the models. Thus, in aggregate lower unit labour
costs might not have improved output and employment.
For a small open economy in which exports play a large role
and which is small enough that there are no feed-back eﬀects
7 Due to space restrictions, I am not able to elaborate further on the par-
ticularities of the single countries experiences with periods of wage restraint
here. The interested reader is refered to Dullien (2003).134 European Political Economy Review
Unit labour costs (in ECU)
Country in 1999 as percentage of
1993 value
Germany 97.9
France 103.8
Italy 104.6
Spain 96.6
Netherlands 104.3
Belgium 103.3
Austria 98.0
Portugal 111.9
Ireland 92.9
Finland ¤109.0
Luxembourg 108.8
EMU-11 103.8
1.5 % annual increase 112.6
2.0 % annual increase 109.3
¤Development for Finland might vastly overstate actual level of real
exchage rate as Finland sharply devalued from 1991 to 1993.
ULC in Finland were 1999 only roughly 77 percent of 1991 value.
Source: European Commission (1998)
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from trade partners the case how lower nominal wages lead to
higher employment is easy: With the nominal exchange rate
ﬁxed, lower nominal wages lead to a real depreciation. As is
standard in trade theory, this would improve the current account
thus increasing aggregate demand and output. A large economy,
however, needs a way how domestic demand is increased when
nominal wages fall – and this is the real balance eﬀect.
While the assumption of a real balance eﬀect increasing ag-
gregate demand when prices are falling is a key element of many
textbook macroeconomic models,8 it is not a necessary assump-
tion. Instead, it might even be problematic as the theoretical
foundation is rather weak.
In standard models such as AS-AD or the New Classical
approaches, real balances inﬂuence aggregate demand via two
channels: First, as real balances are part of the private sector’s
net wealth, and consumption is a function of net wealth, con-
sumption increases with increasing real balances (Pigou eﬀect).
Second, when individuals suddenly face higher real balances than
they would hold in equilibrium, they start reallocating their as-
sets. They will start buying bonds against their money holdings
which will drive down the interest rate. Lower interest rates then
translate into higher investment demand (Keynes eﬀect).
Thus, money needs to be net wealth for the private sector
for the Pigou eﬀect to work. For the Keynes eﬀect to work, the
money supply has to be set exogeneously. Both assumptions are
questionable on empirical and theoretical terms. In the Euro
area, money comes into circulation by banks borrowing money
from the European Central Bank to lend it out to their clients.
An increased money stock always comes with equivalently in-
creased liability of some private party. In consequence, with
changes in the price level the net wealth position of the private
sector remains unchanged: As the money stock is backed by the
same amount of private-sector’s liabilities to the central bank,
private sector debt increases at the same time and by the same
8 It should be noted that some very recent contribution such as Romer
(1999), Romer (2000) or Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) completely drop
the real balance eﬀect as mechanism of monetary policy transmission. See
below.136 European Political Economy Review
amount as does gross private sector wealth when prices fall. In
consequence, private net wealth does not change with changes
in the price level.
As a counter-argument one could argue that at least a small
share of money circulating in the Euro area is in fact backed by
government debt.9For this part of the money supply one could
argue that a fall in prices increases private wealth since private
liabilities are not increased. But, even for money backed by
government debt it is questionable if a Pigou eﬀect can be at
work: If Ricardian equivalence holds and thus an increase in
the stock of government debt hold by the public does not make
the economy richer (as they expect to service the debt by higher
future taxes), the private sector does not get richer when the real
value of government debt rises due to a fall in the price level: The
real debt burden of the government (and thus future tax burden)
would rise exactly by the same amount the real value of money
in the individuals’ portfolios increases. The net eﬀect would be
zero.
The fact that money comes into existence when commercial
banks borrow from the central bank also calls into question the
notion of a Keynes eﬀect when prices change. In the standard
textbook models, the real value of money available for credit in
the economy increases with a falling price level. However, as in
reality the money stock is not exogeneously ﬁxed and money is
created as a reﬂex to credit demand and to the commercial banks’
willingness to provide loans, one can assume that the money
stock moves proportionally with the price level: As households
and ﬁrms need credits in order to conduct real investment or to
consume more in real terms, they will demand accordingly less
credit when prices are falling (Betz 2001, p. 58ﬀ).
For the case of ﬁrms and households being credit constrained,
it is the banking sector which will change the nominal credit vol-
ume with a changing price level. With all prices decreasing, also
expected future nominal household or ﬁrm earnings will decrease.
The banks will lower their nominal credit ceilings. The opposite
9 This stock mostly dates from the time before the beginning of European
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is true for rising prices. As expected future nominal cash-ﬂows
increase, credit ceilings are raised. If neither banks nor ﬁrms live
under money illusion, the real credit constraint does not change
when the price level changes.
These problems with real balance eﬀects have led to a recent
trend away from models which rely on the real balance eﬀect as a
mechanism of monetary policy transmission. Romer (1999, 2000)
as well as modern literature on the eﬃciency of monetary policy
rules building on New Keynesian models as presented in Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (1999) use the short term (real) interest rate
as the way monetary policy aﬀects the real economy and drop
real balances completely from the picture. This path will also
be followed by the model presented in this article.
3.2. The Baseline Model
The model presented here builds on models of monopolistic com-
petition as presented in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977),Blanchard and
Fischer (1989, chapter 8) or Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) which
are widely used today. It takes into account some of the mod-
iﬁcations made by Coricelli, Cukierman, and Dalmazzo (2000),
notably the proﬁt maximising ﬁrm. The main change,however,
is that aggregate demand will not be modeled as a function of
real balances.
The economy is composed of n monopolistically competitive
ﬁrms each producing a good i given a simple production function
with constant returns to scale. Labour Ni is the only input
factor. For simplicity, a labour productivity of unity is assumed:
yi = Ni (1)
Each ﬁrm faces a (real) demand yD
i for its output10 being a
function of the price of its good Pi, the price level P, the share
®i this particular good has in the individuals’ CES-utility func-
tion11, the (absolute value of the) elasticity of demand facing the
10 Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 376ﬀ) show how to derive this demand
function from the individuals’ maximisation decisions.
11 All ®’s add up to 1.138 European Political Economy Review
individual ﬁrm ´ and the aggregate nominal demand Y D which
will be speciﬁed more in detail later on:
y
D
i =
1
n
µPi
P
¶¡´ Y D
P
(2)
As standard in models of monopolistic competition, for an equi-
librium to exist, ´ > 1 must hold (Blanchard and Fischer 1989,
p. 377). The aggregate price level is given by:
P =
0
@
n X
j=1
1
n
P
(1¡´)
j
1
A
1
1¡´
(3)
Each single ﬁrm maximises its proﬁts by choosing the price of
its good given nominal wages Wi it has to pay and given the
demand function it faces:12
max
Pi
Πi = Piy
D
i ¡ WiNi (4)
Maximising and solving for Pi yields:
Pi =
¡´
(1 ¡ ´)
Wi (5)
3.3. Aggregates in a large closed economy
If we now have an economy in which the general nominal wage
level W is set by some monopoly union and is thus the same for
all ﬁrms, we get for the aggregate price level P:
P = P1 = ::: = Pn =
¡´
(1 ¡ ´)
W (6)
Thus, prices are proportional to the general wage level. Sub-
stituting (6) into (2) yields output and employment of each ﬁrm:
Ni = yi = y
D
i =
1
n
¢
(1 ¡ ´)
¡´W
Y
D (7)
Aggregating over all ﬁrms, we get aggregate output y and aggre-
gate employment N:
12 For computational details, see the appendix.Dullien : Is Small Really Beautiful? 139
N = y =
(1 ¡ ´)
¡´
Y D
W
(8)
If now Y D were a function of the real money supply M=P, the
results from the SICCD approach would hold: Unions could in-
duce prices to fall and thus the real money supply and aggregate
demand to increase by restraining their wages. In consequence,
real output and employment would also increase.
However, as I have argued above, the case for a signiﬁcant real
balance eﬀect on aggregate demand is rather weak. Instead, ag-
gregate demand here will be modeled as the sum of consumption
and investment demand, consumption being a constant share c
of the wage bill,13 real investment j as a negative function of the
central banks real short term interest rate r:14
Y
D = cNW + Pj (r) (9)
Substituting (8) and (6) into (9) and solving yields for aggregate
nominal demand:
Y
D =
(¡´)
2
¡(´ + c(1 ¡ ´))(1 ¡ ´)
Wj (r) (10)
Substituting (10) into (8) yields for aggregate real output and
aggregate employment:
N = y =
¡´
(¡´ ¡ c(1 ¡ ´))
j (r) (11)
Thus, real output and employment are independent from the
nominal wage level. Instead, the propensity to consume, the
elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent goods in the economy
(which Blanchard and Giavazzi (2000) interpret as the degree
13 The basic results do not rely on the assumption that in this model all of
the proﬁts are saved. If we allow also entrepreneurs to consume part of their
proﬁts, the multiplier get more complicated, but the basic result of output
and employment being independent of nominal wages remains intact.
14 It is quite plausible to assume a given real amount of investment as a
decision to invest is made for a certain project as a new building, a new
machine and not for a nominal amount of investment. This assumes an
absence of money illusion on behalf of investors.140 European Political Economy Review
of monopolisation) as well as the real interest level set by the
central bank determine aggregate output and employment. The
higher the propensity to consume, the higher output. The higher
the degree of monopolisation, the lower output.
Real wages $ and aggregate real proﬁts Π=P are given by:
$ =
W
P
=
1 ¡ ´
¡´
(12)
Π
P
=
1
´ + c(1 ¡ ´)
j (r) (13)
Thus, also real wages and real proﬁts are independent from
the nominal wage level. Instead, the higher the degree of monop-
olisation, the lower real wages and the higher aggregate proﬁts.
A change in nominal wages thus only changes prices, but
leaves real wages, real proﬁts, output and employment unchanged.
As nominal wages do not have any inﬂuence on the level of em-
ployment, there is no tendency for a full employment equilibrium
to be obtained. Instead, investment demand determines the level
of unemployment. Thus, nominal wage restraint in this context
is without consequences. Consequently, it is only rational for
unions in large economies not to proceed this path further. A
monopoly union thus would not engage in wage restraint.
3.4. A small country within a currency union
However, what is true for EMU as a whole does not need to hold
for a single small country within EMU. To cover this case with
our baseline model, we have to relax the assumption of an overall
wage level for all of the economy. Instead, we will assume that all
but one of our n ﬁrms are covered by the monopoly union. Firm
j is covered by a diﬀerent union. This single ﬁrm could stand for
one of the smaller economies of the Eurozone or alternatively for
one sector of those smaller economies.15 Starting from (5) and
15 The results of this article would not change if the single country consisted
of several ﬁrms for which one union sets wages as long as the ﬁrms have a
combined weight small enough that the wages paid in these ﬁrms do neither
signiﬁcantly aﬀect aggregate demand nor aggregate prices.Dullien : Is Small Really Beautiful? 141
(2), we get the proﬁt maximising output of ﬁrm j as a function
of the wages in that ﬁrm:
Nj = y
D
j =
1
n
Ã
¡´
1 ¡ ´
Wj
P
!¡´ Y D
P
(14)
Assuming that ﬁrm j (the small country) is suﬃciently small
that changes in Wj neither signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the price level
P nor aggregate demand Y D we see easily that the small sin-
gle union can inﬂuence employment in its ﬁrm by varying the
nominal wage demanded:
Nj = yj =
1
n
Ã
W
Wj
!´ ¡´
¡´ ¡ c(1 ¡ ´)
j (r) (15)
Thus, a small country in a currency union together with a
large country for which a monopoly union sets the wage level has
the possibility to inﬂuence its own employment and real wage by
setting its nominal wage level just as it is assumed for all unions
via the real balance eﬀect in Soskice and Iversen (2000) or Cori-
celli, Cukierman, and Dalmazzo (2000). As we see, the larger
the degree of substitution between diﬀerent goods (or diﬀerently
put: the smaller monopoly power) the less diﬀerence between the
general wage level W and the wage level in ﬁrm j is necessary
in order to achieve a given increase in employment.
In order to ﬁnd out what the union actually does with this
possible trade-oﬀ, we need to analyse the union’s utility function.
As it is standard in the literature, we assume that the union cares
both about employment and the real wage paid. The utility
function contains both the deviation of actual employment Nj
from what the union perceives as full employment ¯ Nj and the real
wage. °1 is the weight the union assigns to real wages and °2 the
weight the union assigns to unemployment (assuming °1 + °2 =
1;°1;°2 ¸ 0):
U
union j = °1
Wj
P
¡ °2
¯
¯ ¯ ¯ Nj ¡ Nj
¯
¯ ¯ (16)
Analysing this utility function yields an local optimum ex-
actly at the point where employment in the ﬁrm j equals the
full employment goal of the small single union. Wages in this142 European Political Economy Review
Figure 2: The single union’s utility function
point are W ¤
j (see ﬁgure 2). With rising wages, the union’s util-
ity ﬁrst falls to a minimum and then starts to increase again.
Maximising (16) and solving for W ¤
j as a function of the gen-
eral wage level (that is the wage set by the large monopoly union
in the rest of the economy) yields:
W
¤
j =
Ã
N
n ¯ Nj
! 1
´
W (17)
The single small union’s wage demand is an increasing func-
tion of the ratio between the employment N
n it would experience
had it chosen a wage equal the general wage level W and its em-
ployment target ¯ Nj. As long as the general level of employment
in the economy is below full employment, a possible equilibrium
for this union would be this wage W ¤
j below the general wage
level. In terms of the European union experience, this equi-
librium would represent the situation chosen by Ireland in the
90s or the Netherlands in the 80s. By undercutting the rest of
the union’s general wage level, those small countries manage toDullien : Is Small Really Beautiful? 143
gamma1=0,86
gamma1=0,94
gamma1=0,98
Wj
Utility
Figure 3: The single union’s utility function with diﬀerent
weights for unemployment
increase their union’s utility by approaching full employment.16
However, as can be seen in ﬁgure 2, the full employment
point is a local maximum, but not a global one. As wages are
increasing, utility raises again and reaches utility levels above
the full employment utility as soon as wages are higher than
W M
j . Whether a union now strives for the full employment local
utility maximum in W ¤
j or for wages above W M
j depends on
two things: First, as we see in ﬁgure 3, the more the small
single union cares about unemployment the higher is the wage
necessary to reach the same utility level as in the full employment
local maximum. Second, the union has to take into account the
diﬃculties it will encounter to reach a wage level above W M
j .
As proﬁts for the ﬁrm j (or, in an EMU context ﬁrms’ proﬁts
in a single small country) are falling with increasing wages, the
16 Note that this increased employment goes hand in hand with increased
output. Part of above-average growth in small countries exercising wage
restraint such as Ireland would thus be a consequence of wage restraint.144 European Political Economy Review
higher W M
j the more diﬃculties will unions face when they try
to get employers to agree on such high wages. At the same time,
the more unequal the bargaining power is distributed between
unions and employers (that is the stronger the unions’ position),
the greater the probability that a union will strive for a high
real wage, low employment solution for their company j. In
the context of EMU, the solution to the right of the general
wage level W might provide an explanation why not all small
countries in EMU got involved in beggar-thy-neighbor policies as
the Netherlands and Ireland did. For those other countries one
would then conclude that unions are either stronger than in the
Netherlands or Ireland or that the speciﬁc union structure of the
latter countries leads to a higher weight the unions assign to low
unemployment. A ﬁnal possible explanation for some countries’
unions’ failure to exploit the opportunity of beggar-thy-neighbor
policies would be a lack of the ability to act strategically, e.g. due
to speciﬁc union structures or lack of experience in dealing with
the new currency union environment.
Recent changes in the wage bargaining process in EMU might
also hint that unions and politicians to an increasing degree un-
derstand the importance of relative wage developments for em-
ployment and growth. In Belgium, for example, a 1996 law re-
stricts wage increases to what is compatible with constant or im-
proving competitivenes, de facto linking Belgian wages to wage
developments in the other important Eurozone countries (Ger-
many, France and the Netherlands). In this article’s reading that
would mean that the law keeps Belgian unions from trying to get
to the high unemployment/high real wage point. In the Nether-
lands, a group of central union experts state at the beginning of
every bargaining round the “appropriate” level of wage growth
and up until 2001 every contract was oﬃcially sanctioned by the
labour union board.17
17 See for both cases Hanck´ e (2002).Dullien : Is Small Really Beautiful? 145
4. Conclusion
The article has shown two things: First, if we loosen the assump-
tion of a real balance eﬀect to be at work in a macroeconomic
model of monopolistic competition, real output, real wages and
employment become independent from the nominal wage level.
Instead, the nominal wage level only inﬂuences nominal vari-
ables as the price level. Consequently, a large monopoly union
will not be able to inﬂuence employment by wage restraint. This
feature might explain while wage restraint in Germany, the nom-
inal wage level of which has a crucial impact on Euro-zone wages,
did not lead to an improvement of the unemployment situtation.
Moreover, taken for face value, this model’s conclusion would be
that unemployment is not a consequence of an excessive wage
level, but of an insuﬃcient aggregate demand.
Second, it has been shown that a union in a small country
which is in a currency union with a large country actually can
inﬂuence its real wage, output and employment level. As the
currency union wide wage (and thus price) level is set by the
large country’s wage contracts, the small country can vary its
real wage by altering its nominal wage. It can thus engage in a
beggar-thy-neighbor strategy, not by nominal depreciation, but
by undercutting the nominal wage level in the absence of an
exchange rate.
These conclusion do not only explain why wage restraint did
not bring much of an improvement in overall employment in
Germany, it also explains why small countries in EMU did better
in battling unemployment than the large ones: They just have
an additional degree of freedom.
This casts a sad shadow on the future of European Mone-
tary Union. If union structures do not converge, there will be
some small countries which systematically strive for a lower real
wage/higher employment solution by beggaring their neighbors
and others who will constantly have an inﬂationary problem and
high unemployment. Moreover, wage bargainers will not be able
to change the unemployment problem as it is a problem of in-
suﬃcient demand which is outside of their reach of control.146 European Political Economy Review
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Appendix
A. Basics
A.1. The ﬁrms’ maximisation problem
Substituting (1) into (4) yields:
max
Pi
Πi = Piy
D
i ¡ WNi
= Piy
D
i ¡ Wy
D
i (18)
= (Pi ¡ Wi)
1
n
µPi
P
¶¡´ Y D
P
(19)
Diﬀerentiating (19) with regard to Pi yields as an optimality
condition:18
1
n
¢
1
P
µP
Pi
¶´
Y
D ¡
1
n
´
P 2
i
µP
Pi
¶´¡1
(Pi ¡ Wi)Y
D = 0 (20)
P ´¡1
P
´
i
= ´
P ´¡1
P
´+1
i
(Pi ¡ Wi) (21)
Pi = ´ (Pi ¡ Wi) (22)
Pi =
¡´
(1 ¡ ´)
Wi (23)
A.2. Firms’ proﬁts
From (7) and (4), we get the proﬁt for each ﬁrm:
Πi = (Pi ¡ W)
1
n
¢
Y D
Pi
(24)
=
Ã
1 ¡
W (1 ¡ ´)
¡´W
!
1
n
Y
D (25)
18 This assumes, of course n being suﬃciently large so that Pi only has a
negligible eﬀect on P.Dullien : Is Small Really Beautiful? 149
=
Ã
1 ¡
(1 ¡ ´)
¡´
!
1
n
Y
D (26)
=
1
n
¢
1
´
Y
D (27)
Aggregating for the whole economy yields for aggregate prof-
its:
Π =
X
Πi =
X 1
n
¢
Y D
´
=
Y D
´
(28)
B. Aggregate Demand as a function of wages
B.1. Only Workers Consume
When we assume consumption as a share of the wage bill, we get
nominal aggregate demand as a multiple of the general nominal
wage level:
Y
D = cNW + Pj (r)
= cNW +
¡´
(1 ¡ ´)
Wj (r) (29)
= c
1 ¡ ´
¡´
Y
D +
¡´
1 ¡ ´
Wj (r) (30)
,
Ã
¡
´ + c(1 ¡ ´)
¡´
!
Y
D =
¡´
1 ¡ ´
Wj (r) (31)
, Y
D =
(¡´)
2
¡(´ + c(1 ¡ ´))(1 ¡ ´)
Wj (r)
With aggregate consumption being a function of the wage
bill such as depicted in (9), however, aggregate output y and ag-
gregate employment N are independent from the nominal wage
level:
y =
(1 ¡ ´)
¡´W
Y
D (32)
=
(1 ¡ ´)
¡´W
(¡´)
2
(1 ¡ ´)(¡´ ¡ c(1 ¡ ´))
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y =
¡´
(¡´ ¡ c(1 ¡ ´))
j (r) (34)
B.2. Real Wages and Proﬁts
In this case, real wages are a function merely of the elasticity of
substitution between produced goods ´
$ =
W
P
= W
Ã
¡´
1 ¡ ´
W
!¡1
=
1 ¡ ´
¡´
(35)
and real aggregate proﬁts Π
P
19 a function of the elasticity of
substitution between goods produced, the propensity to consume
c and the real investment undertaken:
Π
P
=
1
´
Y D
P
(36)
=
1
´ + c(1 ¡ ´)
j (r) (37)
B.3. Entrepreneurs as Consumers
The central result of output, employment and real proﬁts being
independent from the nominal wage level also holds when one as-
sumes entrepreneurs to consume part of their proﬁts. Aggregate
demand then is given by the sum of consumption out of wages
(with marginal propensity cW), consumption out of proﬁts (with
marginal propensity cΠ) and investment:
Y
D+ = cWNW + cΠΠ + Pj (r) (38)
= cW
1¡´
¡´ Y D+ + cΠY D+ +
¡´
1¡´Wj (r) (39)
,
Ã
¡
´ + c(1 ¡ ´) ¡ cΠ
¡´
!
Y
D+ =
¡´
1 ¡ ´
W (40)
, Y
D+ =
(¡´)
2
¡(´ + cW (1 ¡ ´) ¡ cΠ)(1 ¡ ´)
Wj (r) (41)
19 With Π being the sum of single ﬁrms’ proﬁts Πi.Dullien : Is Small Really Beautiful? 151
For real output, we get:
y
+ =
¡´
(¡´ ¡ cW (1 ¡ ´) + cΠ)
j (r) (42)
Thus, when entrepreneurs consume part (or even all) of their
proﬁts, only the investment multiplier becomes larger.
C. Small Union vis-` a-vis Large Union
C.1. Output and Wages
A single ﬁrms output changes when the wage it has to pay Wj
changes while the general wage level W remains unchanged:
@yD
j
@Wj
=
1
n
Ã
¡´
1 ¡ ´
!¡´ h
¡´W
¡´¡1
j P
´¡1Y
D
¡(1 ¡ ´)
@P
@Wj
P
´¡1Y
D +
@Y D
@Wj
W
¡´
j P
´¡1
#
(43)
With @P
@Wj = 0 and @Y D
@Wj = 0, we get:
@yD
j
@Wj
=
1
n
Ã
¡´
1 ¡ ´
!¡´ h
¡´W
¡´¡1
j P
´¡1Y
D
i
< 0
By choosing the nominal wage, a single union can determine
employment in its ﬁrm. For a given employment goal ¯ N we get
from 14:
(W
¤
j )
´ =
1
n
Ã
1 ¡ ´
¡´
!´
P
´¡1Y D
¯ Nj
(44)
Substituting (6), using (10) and (11) and solving for W ¤
j yields:
W
¤
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Ã
1
n
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¢
Y D
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! 1
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W (47)